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Abstract 
  
There is evidence there is a global gender price gap in traditional global art auctions. 
Taking into account recent technological advances in the secondary art market, this study 
examines if there is a gender gap for the sale prices of female artists’ work in the contemporary, 
online art auction market. The analysis uses a unique data set of art works sold in Christie’s 
Online-Only Auctions for the year of 2018.  We regress measures of price on gender and 
controls for various characteristics of the art work and artist. We find that while there is discount 
in prices of 17% for artwork created by female artists, further analysis indicates the difference is 
not necessarily the result of bidder’s biased prices, but rather rooted in the pre-sale estimates 
given by the auction houses.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Why are there no great women artists?  In 1971, Linda Nochlin argued in her famous essay “Why 
Have There Been No Great Women Artists?” that institutions could be the cause of this. She argues that 
this difference is due to the systematic way in which women have been excluded from being nurtured as 
artists throughout the ages, which is rooted “in our institutions and our education” (Nochlin,1971). 
Perhaps then, one of these institutions is art auctions. There is economic evidence that women are 
paid proportionately less than men in the form of wages (Goldin et al., 2017) all over the world, but most 
notably in the United States and in the UK (Dias et al., 2018).  Are women compensated less for their 
artistic work as well? In global art auctions, there seems to be evidence of this phenomenon. This, dubbed 
here as the “auction gap”, is the notion that art made by women is sold for lower auction prices than art 
made by men. Recently, this idea was supported by a study conducted in 2017 that found there is as high 
as a 47.6% gender discount in auction prices for paintings created by women artists born from 1850 to the 
present time (Adams et al., 2017). 
Given then, that there is evidence of an auction gap existing for art created and sold across a wide 
time period, I want to examine the possible existence of this auction gap from a more specific time period, 
particularly for contemporary art created by women artists, sold as recently as possible. I will seek to 
answer the question, can auction prices for contemporary artists’ art be explained by the gender of an 
artist? I will go about answering this question through gathering auction price points from the last year, 
and using three ordinary least square (OLS) regression models to analyze the effect of gender on these 
prices. 
For contemporary art sold at auction today, recent headlines make it seem as though the auction 
gap may not be as prominent for contemporary art created by women artists. Although there is virtually 
no formal statistical analysis of this evidence, there is anecdotal evidence that work generated by 
prominent contemporary women artists are fetching higher prices at auction. In recent years, auction 
prices specifically for contemporary art by women artists seems to be on the rise, as women artists break 
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their own records and defy auction price predictions. For example, Suddenly Last Summer (1999) by 
Cecily Brown, went for $6.8 million, more than double her prior record, at a Sotheby’s auction in New 
York in May 2016. Likewise, Louis Bourgeois’ Sculpture Spider (1996) piece jumped three slots ahead of 
predicted auction sales at a Christie’s Post-War sale in the fall of 2015, selling for $28.2 million. 
Additionally, Cady Noland, another contemporary artist, had her work Bluewald (1989) sell for $9.7 
million, exceeding the high estimate of $8 million as a Christies New York Auction in 2015, which also 
surpassed the artist’s prior record which was Oozewald (1989), which drew in $6.5 million in 2011 
(Shultz, 2018). Of course, anecdotal evidence of trends does not guarantee statistical proof of anything. 
However, through analyzing a subset of contemporary artworks and artists, we do have a better chance of 
finding if auction prices actually can be explained by a contemporary artist’s gender, and by how much. 
Women being compensated less than their male counter parts, even in secondary markets, is an 
economic problem because it perpetuates gender inequality in the field of visual arts. Auctions are 
secondary markets, which means the paintings have already been traded in the primary market, (through 
galleries, perhaps even from the artist directly). When a work of art goes up for sale on the secondary 
market, this signals that the artist is producing work that is valued and in demand for resale (Bocart et al., 
2017). Once an artist’s work enters the secondary market, the auction results are more visible to the 
public than those of the primary market. Consultants, gallery owners, appraisers and art collectors use this 
readily available information when they value artists current and potential worth. This means that while 
auction prices do not directly compensate the artist, they do influence gallery prices, and can have a 
significant effect on an artist’s career and incentives for making art (Galeson, 2000). The implications of 
this, if there is a gender price discount, are serious, as it means that women may have less of an incentive 
to continue to create art or even enter artistic careers at all, perpetuating gender inequality in the field of 
visual arts even further. 
Using OLS, we regress auction prices against certain variables characterizing the artists and the 
work of art sold on online, contemporary art markets. Section II delves into past literature on gender 
biases in valuing women’s art and the gender price gap in art auctions. Section III outlines the data used 
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in our empirical study. Section IV explains the models and theory behind it, and Section V describes the 
results of the study.  Finally, Section VI discusses the importance of these results, their limitations, and 
their implications for future research. 
 
 
II.             Literature Review 
  
While multiple studies have examined certain biases within both secondary and primary art 
markets, few studies have examined solely gender biases in the art market. In addition, the field of art 
market economics has historically focused largely on evaluating patterns related to the rate of return in art 
as an investment, rather than linked with determinants of prices. However, in the past year, there have 
been multiple paramount studies using both empirical and experimental techniques to determine the role 
gender plays in the auction prices artworks gather. 
In the art market, there are two points where prices are determined: The primary and secondary 
markets. The primary market is when the painting is sold for the first time, which can include galleries, 
art fairs and studios (Zorloni, 2005). The secondary market (which is the focus of this paper) examines 
the point when existing artworks exchange, generally in auctions. The nature of the secondary market has 
been found to be considerably more predictable than primary markets, because of information available 
on the art and the artist (Zorloni, 2005). Although our research focuses on data drawn from the secondary 
market, it is useful to examine both types of markets to gain a general understanding of how cultural 
gender biases can play a role in determining art prices. Across the literature, conclusions regarding the 
presence of a gender bias against women are mixed. 
In a study of Australian contemporary art controlling for artist specific characteristics, such death 
day or projected life span, age and fame, researchers found that non-indigenous female artists sold their 
paintings for more than men in galleries (Coate and Fry, 2012). However, in a study of Dutch 
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contemporary art, Rengers and Velthuis (2002) find that in the male-dominated Dutch primary art market, 
female artists receive lower prices for their work. They explain that because they determine that age 
contributes positively to explaining art prices, the difference in age between genders in the data set can be 
blamed in part for the discount, as female artists tend to be younger than their male colleagues. 
            Additionally, there have been three empirical studies released in the past year examining art 
exclusively in the secondary art market, using considerably large data sets (millions of recent auction 
prices) of artworks which span across styles and centuries. Findings regarding a gender gap in this type of 
study are inconclusive as well. The two most comprehensive studies, in terms of sheer amount of data 
points used, have found female artists’ work to be associated with significant price discounts in auction 
markets (Bocart et al., and Adams, 2017).  The third study however, (Cameron et al., 2017) which 
samples Yale MFA artists’ work, concludes that auction prices aren’t negatively biased against female 
artists’ work, going so far as to refute the previous literature by concluding that women’s work commands 
a premium. This last study is interesting, as its sample focuses only on artists who graduated from one of 
the most prestigious art school in the country. This characteristic of the study could account for this 
study’s diverging findings, as institutional barriers on the art market may require female artists pass 
through more rigorous quality filters as compared to male artists (Cameron et al., 2017). In other words, 
there is sample selection bias: it makes sense that the female artists in this study- those who graduate from 
Yale (a rigorous institution acting as a quality filter) would demand a premium, as they likely had to have 
been making art of a higher quality than their male counterparts in order to even get into the school. 
Although results on that front are mixed, consistent across a majority of the literature is the theory 
that the art auction market follows a “winner take all” model (Bocart et al., 2017). This model stipulates 
that an extremely small amount of sales, usually no larger than a single percentage point or two, 
represents a large portion of the total dollar volume gathered by sales in the market. As Bocart et al. 
observe, (2017) the distribution of rewards market is highly skewed with the largest profits concentrated 
on top. Because of this skewness, and the nature of information in secondary art markets, there seems to 
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be a subsequent ‘superstar’ effect suggesting that it is only a select few artists at the top who rake in a 
majority of these sales. 
The Adams et al study, which uses a sample of roughly 1.5 million transactions from 1970 to 
2013, found a 47.6% gender discount in auction prices for paintings created by women artists born from 
1850 to the present time. When accounting for mega-transactions, (the superstar effect) the discount drops 
from 43.6% in the 1970s to an average of 25% after 2000 (2017).  Similarly, because the data was highly 
skewed by a small number of women located at the top of the market that they were discovering, the 
Bocart study similarly accounted for the number of artworks sold per artist and found a discount of 10% 
for female artists’ work (2017). 
Experimental studies have also concluded that there may be a cultural bias to deem women’s 
artwork as less valuable than men’s. Adams et al. (2017) conducted a study in which they had participants 
take a survey and value art on a scale based on how much they liked it. Names of female and male artists 
were displayed under the artwork, even though in reality the artwork was generated with a computer 
algorithm. Researchers found that more affluent individuals (people who indicated they visit an art gallery 
or exhibition at least a few times a year) were shown to be associated with a 6% gender discount in 
valuing art they were told was created by women artists, which is economically significant (Adams et al., 
2017). This is particularly striking, as this population represents the subset of people most similar to the 
population likely to be bidding at art auctions. In an additional experiment, the same researchers asked 
participants of a study to say if they thought an artwork was made by a male or female artist, and then rate 
their appreciation for it. Results showed that participants could not correctly guess the gender of an artist 
by looking at a painting, suggesting that structural differences that might exist between genders are not 
readily observable. 
Some research suggests that the gender disparity in auction prices has decreased in recent years, 
supporting the hypothesis that as cultural gender inequality decreases over time, this decrease influences 
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the discount (Adams et al., 2017). Is this true of only certain kinds of art created in a specific period or is 
the auction gap also closing for contemporary artists’ work as well? There seems to be a bias in the data 
gathered and observed in the studies as it includes work spanning styles and centuries instead of focusing 
on a single genre. The auction years span widely, including both artists that are dead and alive, but 
certainly weighing toward artists who are deceased.  This means that the data used in these studies could 
be largely influenced by the historical repression of women artists, barring historical women’s art from 
entering the art market and changing the standards by which they were valued (Adams et al., 2017). 
There also seems to be a gap for the type of auctions observed. The existing literature focuses on 
auction markets that take place almost exclusively in physical salerooms. In recent years, however, there 
has been a trend toward art auctions moving online, with the two largest traditional auction houses, 
Christie’s and Sotheby’s, offering year-round online-only auctions. 
By focusing my research supremely on the contemporary, Avant Garde online art market, my 
study would seek to fill in the gap that exists in studying 1) contemporary art markets, 2) the 
responsiveness of the market for living and recently deceased artists, and 3) the advent of online auctions. 
It would also serve to capture the Feminist art movement within this time frame, which beginning in the 
1960’s, greatly increased women’s participation in visual arts institutions such as galleries, museums and 
auctions (Shultz, 2018). The data from this market differs considerably from that of the aforementioned 
studies because this market is international, highly speculative, and unpredictable. 
  
III.          Data 
 
The auction data was obtained from Christie’s database of online auction results. Christie’s is 
ranked the first auction house in the world when it comes to online auction sales, based on a conglomerate 
of rankings determined by visitors’ and buyers’ experiences with the house (Hiscox, 2018). 
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In order to understand this section more completely, some background on art auctions must first 
be given. Online art Auctions are conducted through online platforms. They are timed, usually over a 
period of a few days or weeks. Bids can be submitted anytime during the course of an online auction, and 
a next bid is submitted, using predetermined bidding increments. The person with the highest bid is 
selected and this final price is known as the hammer price (or as in my data, the price realized). When 
bids are placed, they do not include transaction fees. Transaction fees include a buyer’s premium, which 
is an additional fee the buyer pays to the auction house based on the hammer price, and indirect taxes (a 
VAT or sales tax as applicable) appropriately applied on the buyer’s premium (Christie’s, 2018). 
In the data set, there are a total of 815 transactions. We restrict our analysis to online auctions 
held in 2018. This is the most recent data available, as Christie’s only started publishing online auction 
results in May of 2017. Transactions were drawn from a total of 9 auctions held throughout the year. Only 
auctions characterized as dealing with pieces identified by Christie’s as “Contemporary and Post-war” in 
style/time-period were considered. 
Within this these style constraints, transactions cover a wide range of work, including paintings, 
drawings, sculptures, pottery, photography, works on paper, and prints and multiples. Transaction 
information provided by the auction house that we gathered included the piece title, the auction it was 
sold in and its date, artist, pre-sale price estimations (a range of values expected for the initial sale of a 
particular artwork given by the auction house based upon prices recently paid at auction for comparable 
property, taking into account condition, rarity, quality, provenance, and other specific factors), hammer 
price (the final bid price, not transaction costs), material/medium, dimensions (size), if there is the artist’s 
signature, and year the work was created. The artist’s birth year, and death year if applicable, was also 
provided. Sales totals for each auction were also provided. These sales totals include buyer’s premiums, 
but are net of additional taxes and fees. Three out of the 9 auction used were conducted in GPB and not 
USD. These values were converted using conversion rates from the average conversion rate of the day of 
the auction opening. The data was scraped from Christie’s website for each auction, and compiled, using 
the free web scraping program ParseHub. 
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To find our variable of interest, the artist’s gender, we initially went through the artists and 
determined the gender of those with obvious male or female names. If the name provided was unisex or 
ambiguous, the artist was then manually researched. If the artist’s gender could not be determined, their 
data was excluded. Works and projects created by multiple artists were also removed from the data. 
Additionally, lots with multiple works were excluded from the data. If there was no “overall” size 
given for a work, meaning that the lot was likely selling more than one work (i.e. a set of prints) that data 
point was also removed. Finally, if a piece was cylindrical, or oddly shaped enough that it had no 
distinguishable height and width, then this observation was also removed. 
In Table 1, we define the variables we use in our analysis. As can be seen in the table, we use a 
mix of variables that describe artist characteristics (Female, Age, Created, Deceased), artwork 
characteristics (Size, Signature, Highestimate), and even auction characteristics (Auctionsaletot). 
                                  
A. Summary Statistics 
In total, the data amounted to 815 transactions for 576 different artists. About 23.7% of 
transactions were female artists’ work. In total, the transactions amounted to $11,770,332.9 with women’s 
work earning 14.76% of total sales.  As the literature suggests, the data seemed to reflect the winner-take 
all model, as the price distribution was quite skewed. 
   
Referring to Table 2, differences are observed between the means of our variables. The mean 
transaction price for male artists was about $16,157, while for female artists is about $8,952, resulting in a 
mean transaction difference of -7204.53 USD, which is significant at the 1% level. Relative to the mean 
price of art gathered by male artists, the mean price for female artists shows a discount of 44.5%. This gap 
in price means for male and female artists hints that there may be a gender price discount in our 
coefficients as we continue into the regression analysis. 
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Also, to note is that the variables Highestimate, Log(price) and Log(estrange) all measured 
differences in means for male and female artists that were negative and statistically significant. This 
negative number is as would be expected, given that we observe the large difference in mean transactions 
given gender. 
  
 
IV.           Theory and Empirical Models 
 
Traditionally, the world of art auctions has been one the most exclusive markets in the world, 
drawing in only the most affluent and powerful bidders into transactions, the machinations and specifics 
of which are not always transparent or widely available. But the advent of the internet and online auctions 
is largely disrupting this market in multiple ways. Now, online auctions mean that there is considerably 
less of the exclusivity that is seen in traditional auctions. Barriers to entry are eliminated in online 
markets, such as bidders having to have the resources available- time and money- to travel to physical 
Auction Houses. Now, anyone with a credit card can bid on art put up for auction on online sales. For 
Christies, the auction house used to collect data in this paper, this removal of barriers to entry has resulted 
in their online auctions being their largest entry point for new buyers. Additionally, the ratio of buyers 
and bidders to lots offered for online sales is now double that of traditional offline auctions. 
Because of this, it is important to consider that online auction prices may be less affected by 
gender than in traditional auction houses. With more bidders per lot, the market becomes more 
competitive, leaving less room for bidding below the estimated prices that auction houses make available, 
and therefore not allowing room for such a large systematic discount on willingness to pay for female 
artists’ work. Also, because online auctions are the largest entry point for new buyers, this may mean new 
bidders who tend not to know much about art markets don’t want to overpay for the art and tend to stay 
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within the estimates given by the auction house, which, assuming those are reasonably unbiased, would 
mean that the online sale price is not as affected by the artist's gender either. 
To estimate the possible gender price discount in online contemporary Art auctions, we estimate 
three ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. Each model uses a different dependent variable. 
We will start by estimating the following regression: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝ℎ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2Age + 𝛽3Created + 𝛽4Deceased 𝛽5Size + 𝛽6Signature + 
𝛽7Auctotsale +  𝛽8Drawdum + 𝛽9Paintdum +  𝑢 
 
Where variables are defined as follows: 
  
• Log(Priceph) is the natural log of the final sale price as a percentage of the high estimate given by 
the auction house. We use the natural log here because auction prices tend to be skewed, and also 
because we are using price in this function, which lends itself to gaining more precise estimates 
when natural log is used.  
• Female is a dummy for if the artist is female. Even though we consider the possibility that online 
auction prices may be less affected by gender than in live salerooms because of the differences in 
market structure and bidder identity, we still hypothesize that there will be a gender discount for 
this variable. 
• Age represents the age of the artist, despite if the artist is still alive. We would expect this to be 
higher for artists’ who are older and the coefficient to be positive, as their supply is now seen as 
more limited by the consumer, and therefore probably more valuable. Art auction houses like 
Christie’s post the dates that an artist was born, and if it applies, the year they died, right next to 
the name, making it one of the first defining variables that a bidder will see when browsing the 
lot. 
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• Deceased is a dummy variable for whether the artist is dead. As implied, this coefficient likely to 
be positive meaning if they are dead, their work goes for more. 
• Created is the year in which the artist executed the work. The general trend in art markets seems 
to be that art increases in value as time passes (people see buying art as an investment). Older art 
will be valued higher by bidders, meaning we expect this coefficient to be negative. 
• Size is the “face” surface of the piece (Height x Width) in total squared cm. We expect this 
coefficient to be positive, as the bigger the work, the more materials and time put into the work, 
demanding a higher price. 
• Signature is a dummy for if the piece is signed by the artist. We believe that bidders are 
especially concerned about the authenticity of an artwork in online auctions. This is also one of 
the few characteristics specified about each work and verified by Christie’s online. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that signed work will be more valuable to bidders, resulting in a positive coefficient. 
• Auctiontotsale is a way to control for the auction the piece was sold in. We assume that online 
auctions with a higher total sale value would mean pieces that were a part of it were worth more, 
driving a positive coefficient for this variable. 
• Paintdum is a dummy for if the artwork is a painting, as identified on Christie’s Website as 
“painted”. We hypothesize that this coefficient would be positive. Paintings are the most 
traditional type of art, easily displayed and collected. For the most part, with a painting it is easy 
to see exactly what you are bidding on from the display pictures online. We assume that because 
of this people will be willing to pay more for this straightforward kind of art. (For other types of 
contemporary art, like statues or sculptures or more conceptual pieces, we hypothesize that 
bidders cannot gather enough information about the piece from the information about it online to 
drive them to bid higher.) 
 
19 
• Drawdum is a dummy variable that indicates if the piece is a drawing. We hypothesize that the 
coefficient will be negative, as drawings tend to be less valuable than paintings in general, as they 
are not only smaller, but usually made with materials that are less valuable. 
 
The logic behind this is that by taking price as a percentage of high estimate, we can get capture the 
willingness to pay of bidders proportional to the estimated value of the piece. 
Moving on to a second model, we simply use the natural log of the price as the dependent variable, 
instead of the price as a percentage of the high estimate. Using this model, we can test more generally 
how well our variables estimate raw auction prices: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2Age + 𝛽3Created + 𝛽4Deceased 𝛽5Size + 𝛽6Signature + 
𝛽7Auctotsale +  𝛽8Drawdum + 𝛽9Paintdum +  𝑢 
  
For this regression, we hypothesize the same signs for the coefficients as in the previous model. 
  
In our third regression, instead of looking at price at all, we use the high-end estimates to further 
examine if there is a price discount present in the estimates that could be influencing the bidder’s 
behavior. The general model can be shown by: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2Age + 𝛽3Created + 𝛽4Deceased 𝛽5Size + 𝛽6Signature + 
𝛽7Auctotsale +  𝛽8Drawdum + 𝛽9Paintdum +  𝑢 
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V.             Results 
 
A. Model 1: Natural Logarithm of Price Percentage as the Dependent Variable 
In table 3, we observe the regression which uses the price as a percentage of the high estimate as 
the dependent variable. In column 1, we observe immediately that the simple regression using only the 
female dummy and the dependent variable does not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship at 
1%. 5%, or 10% percent levels. The results for the entire regression using all of our variables, as shown in 
column 2, do not yield any statistically significant relationships either. As we add variables to each 
regression, the only combinations that yield statistically significant results for the regression represented 
in column 2, where only the variables that are associated with the artist’s characteristics are controlled for 
(including the dummy for if the artist is dead, the age of the artist, and the female dummy variables), is 
the age coefficient, yielding a positive relationship of 0.0052784, being significant at the 1% level. The 
sign of this coefficient is as we anticipated, showing a positive relationship between the percentage of 
price over the high estimate, and the artist’s age, even if it is quite small. In column 3, which is the 
regression which includes all of our variables, the only statistically significant result was the created 
coefficient, which yielded a negative relationship of -0.0047*, significant at the 10% level. The sign of 
this coefficient is negative, as we hypothesized. 
Observing column 3, it is curious that only one of our other variables is statistically significant. In 
order to check if multicollinearity could be a problem between our variables, a Variance Inflation Factor 
test was performed. This resulted in a value of 1.78, signifying that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
From the R-squared value from our regression in column 3, we can determine that only a small 
fraction, about 2.5%, of the changes in the dependent variable can be explained by our independent 
variables. This suggests that this using price percentage variable is perhaps not the best dependent 
variable to use in a model with these independent variables. 
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B.    Model 2: Natural Logarithm of Price as the Dependent Variable 
The motivation behind this regression was to examine the relationship between auctions price and 
all of our variables more generally. Even though this model is likely weaker in that it does not directly 
take the auction estimates into account and allows for potentially more unexplained variability in our 
model, it is definitely worth examining. 
As we can see from column 3 of Table 4, using Log(Price) as the dependent variable rather than 
Log(Priceph) shows an increase in explanatory power, as we now observe an R-squared value of 0.1722, 
indicating a this model better fits our data. 
In column 1, when log(price) is regressed solely against the female dummy, a coefficient of -
0.4020 is given, statistically significant at the 1% level, showing already that there is a gender discount of 
40.2%, when not controlling for any of the other variables. We add our variables into our model, first 
controlling for artist-specific identifiers in column 2, and then moving onto include both artist-specific 
variables and variables that characterize the artwork. In column 3, all but two of the coefficients yielded 
are significant at least at the 10% level. 
Looking at column 3, we can see that the model estimates a coefficient of -.1707 for our female 
dummy variable for log(price). This means the price is 17.07 % lower for female artists work than for 
work by male artists. This negative sign on the coefficient is as we predicted, as we anticipated that the 
online art market would ultimately show a price discount for female artists work.  Continuing to observe 
column 3, it is interesting to note that the out of the five statistically significant coefficients, the female 
dummy was far from the most impactful. Interestingly enough, the dummy variable for painting shows 
the largest coefficient, revealing a 51% percent increase in price works that exhibit this characteristic. The 
sign on this variable is as we hypothesized as well. The last observation worth noting is that the 
coefficient of the signature dummy is not only the third most impactful in the regression, but also 
negative. It shows that signed pieces actually sell for at a price discount of 19.95%. This unexpected 
outcome may be a result of the artists choices, as perhaps as artists become more well-known and their art 
more valued, they stop signing their now easily recognizable pieces. 
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The gender discount of 17% is striking, but it should be taken with a grain of salt. Considering 
our model, there are certainly significant limitations. Other factors that are not observed could certainly 
go into determining this difference. Of particular concern are the pre-sale estimates. 
 
C.    Model 3: Log(Highestimate) as the Dependent Variable and Comparison in Female 
Dummy Coefficients 
In order to see if the pre-sale estimates themselves were biased, this last model was created and 
the subsequent regressions run. Immediately, just regressing our dependent variable on the dummy 
coefficient, we notice that there is a price discount for female artists pieces of 40.2%. In our complete 
regression in column 3, we observe that similar to our Log(Price) model, as the movement from male 
artists to females artists produced a -19.71% difference in auction price. This similar gender price 
discount to the Log(price) model drives us to directly compare their difference with a statistical test for 
significance.  If the coefficients for the two models are similar, then we can conclude that this difference 
in prices is likely coming from the pre-sale estimates, and specifically the high estimates. 
Drawing from research on comparing regression coefficients between models conducted by 
Clogg et al., (1995), we identify and use the following equation: 
 
𝑍 =  
𝛽1 − 𝛽2
√(𝑆𝐸𝛽1)2 + (𝑆𝐸𝛽2)2
 
 
 
where SE𝛽is the standard error of 𝛽 
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By plugging our coefficients into the formula, we can check if the difference in coefficients is 
statistically significant. This test results in a p-value of 0.421. This high p-value means we fail to reject 
the null that the difference between the coefficients is statistically significant. 
This finding further supports the conclusion that virtually all of the price difference as manifested 
in the female dummy coefficient in the Log(price) model is coming from the auction house through the 
pre-sale high estimates they set, and not directly from the bidders. 
  
VI.           Conclusion 
 
The finding that the price difference is rooted in the pre-sale auction estimates, and likely not a 
result of bidders, of course begs the question: Why is the price difference coming from the estimates? 
This could be due to simply gender bias, but another likely answer is that there are characteristics about 
the art pieces or artists that are known to the appraisers, but unknown to us and unaccounted for our 
model. This limitation lends itself to ample room for additional research. In continuing research, it may be 
enlightening to include variables capturing more of the expert knowledge that the appraisers are 
considering when valuing an art piece. Examples of these variables would be if the artist has had their 
work displayed in certain galleries, museums or shows that suggest the artist is trending in the art world, 
or some type of measure for quality of work. 
Additionally, drawing upon our analysis and the fact that the artist-specific variables (female, age, 
deceased) tend to be significant in our last two models, it would likely also be beneficial to measure the 
effect of more variables that describe artists’ characteristics, such as ethnicity or country of origin, and 
some type of measure for fame.  Taking these variables into account would likely lend a model of better 
fit for the dependent variable of price that we want to describe. 
Through investigating the price discount for women’s art in online auctions, and also the fact that 
an overwhelming majority of male artists in this sample (about 75%) reflects the art world’s long history 
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of gender inequality, we bring to light issues of gender inequality in art as it intersects with not only 
economics, but with technology as well. The finding that the estimates are what is driving the female 
price discount in our second model has important implications as it relates to online markets. Although 
certain aspects of online auctions and the incorporation of technology into the way the market works (as 
we discussed in the Theory section) could potentially deter bidders from exhibiting gender biases, if the 
pre-sale estimates are biased, then these could still be reflected in bidder’s prices. This is because bidders 
won’t want to feel like they are overpaying, so sale price likely acts a function of the estimated price. 
Although this study has its limitations, it has broad implications for the continued study of the 
economic outcomes of women artists with regards to the biases not only in buyers, but in the auction 
houses valuing their work before bidding even begins. 
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VII. Appendix 
Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition 
Price Final sale price for the work in 2018 US$. In regression frameworks, we use the 
natural logarithm of this variable, written as Log(Price) 
Female Dummy Variable equal to one if the artist is female, and zero if male. 
Age Age of the artists at the time of auction (2018) in years. Variable is calculated 
regardless of if the artist is dead or alive at the actual auction time. 
Created The year in which the artist executed the work. 
Deceased Dummy variable equal to one if the artist is deceased at the time of the auction. 
  
Size The “face” surface of the piece (Height x Width) in total squared cm. 
Signature Dummy variable equal to one if the work is signed with the artist’s name, 
initials, or stamp.  
  
Auctiontotsale The sale total the auction accrued in 2018 US$. 
Highestimate The high-end estimate given by the house for the work in 2018 US$. In 
regression frameworks, we use the natural logarithm of this variable, written as 
Log(Priceph) 
Priceph 
  
Price as percentage of the high-end estimate given for the work, in 2018 US$. In 
regression frameworks, we use the natural logarithm of this variable, written as 
Log(Priceph) 
 
Log(Estrange)  
 The natural log of the range between the high and low-end estimates given by 
the house 
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Table 2: Variable Summary Statistics  
Variable Total Sample Female Artists  Male Artists Difference  Gender Gap (%) 
N. 
Transactions 
815 194 621 
  
Price 14442.13 
(802. 57) 
8952.55 
(670.794) 
16157.07 
(200.522) 
-7204.53*** 
(1223.16) 
-44.5% 
Female .2380368 
(0.014927) 
- - - - 
Age 64.92761 
(0.768377) 
56.96392 
(1.218072) 
67.41546 
(0.911630) 
-10.45154*** 
( 740.9747 ) 
 
Created 1995.745 
(0.599572) 
2002.335 
(0.8415589) 
1993.686 
(0.722372) 
8.649*** 
( 1.109073 ) 
 
Deceased .2110429 
(0.01430) 
0.0670103 
(0.017998) 
0.2560386 
(0.0175279) 
-
0.1890283*** 
(.0251231) 
 
Size 10683.91 
(582.354305) 
11624.59 
(1220.940977) 
10390.04 
(662.419143)  
1234.55 
(1389.063) 
 
Signature 0.802454 
(0.013955) 
0.7835052 
(0.029646) 
0.8083736 
(0.0158065) 
-0.0248684 
( .0335966) 
 
Auctiontotsale 2124028 
(35879.24374) 
1895590 
(69083.40583) 
2195392 
(41466.8669) 
-299802*** 
(80573.07) 
 
Paintdum 0.2331288 
(0.014819) 
0.2216495 
(0.029898) 
0.236715 
(0.0170710) 
-0.0150655 
( .0344284) 
 
Drawdum 0.0576687 
(0.0081707) 
0.0463918 
(0.015140) 
0.0611916 
(0.0096258) 
-0.0147998 
(.0179409) 
 
Highestimate 10323.07 
(486.149657) 
6635.052 
(408.722594) 
11475.2 
(618.052944) 
-4840.148*** 
(740.9747) 
 
Log(Price)  8.852222  
(0.31008) 
8.545907 
(0.0836593) 
8.947914 
(0.0503173)  
-0.402007*** 
( .0976254) 
 
Log(Priceph) 0.159099 
(0.005573) 
0.1197612 
(0.0580846) 
0.1713881 
(0.0309867) 
-0.0516269 
( .0658331) 
 
Log(estrange) 7.568298 
(0.036526) 
7.309785 
(0.067181) 
7.649057 
(0.0426107) 
-0.339272*** 
( .0795553) 
 
 
Notes:  *** Signifies significance at the p<0.01 level (1%) level, determined by a two-sample t-test. 
Table 3: Regression Analysis using Price as Dependent Variable 
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  (1) (2) (3)   
  Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)   
Variables         
Female -0.4020*** 
(0.10) 
-0.1894*** 
(0.09) 
-0.1708* 
(.0963) 
  
Age   0.0127 *** 
(2.91) 
0.0117*** 
(0.004) 
  
Deceased   0.4248 *** 
(0.84) 
0.3661997** 
(0.154) 
  
Created     -0.006258 
(0.004) 
  
Size     2.14E-06 
(0) 
  
Signature       
-0.1995** 
(0.102) 
  
Auctiontotsale     9.98E-08** 
(4.12E-08) 
  
Drawdum     -0.0837 
(0.177) 
  
Paintdum     0.5176*** 
(0.097) 
  
Constant 8.9478* 
(0.0495) 
7.985 *** 
(2.26) 
10.99 
(8.53) 
  
Observations 815 815 815   
R-Squared 0.0189 0.1300 0.1722   
Notes: Table shows the results for the OLS estimation of a model, showing the coefficients associated 
with each variable and robust standard errors in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
   
 
 
 
Table 4: Regression Analysis Using Price as Percentage of High Estimate as Dependent Variable  
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  (1) (2) (3)   
  Log(Priceph) Log(Priceph) Log(Priceph)   
Variables   
 
    
Female   -.0516269    
( .06) 
.0144779 
(.06) 
0.0263 
(0.07) 
  
Age     .0052784*** 
( .00 ) 
0.0030 
(0.002) 
  
Deceased    .0578615  
(.10) 
0.0038 
(0.10) 
  
Created   
 
-0.0047* 
(0.003) 
  
Size   
 
1.33-07 
(1.63E-06) 
  
Signature   
 
-0.0230 
(0.07) 
  
Auctiontotsale   
 
2.82E-08 
(2.79E-08) 
  
Drawing   
 
-0.1970 
(0.12) 
  
Paint   
 
0.0549 
(0.07) 
  
Constant .1713881 
(.03)  
 -.1992721    
(.11) 
9.3014 
(5.77) 
  
Observations 815 
 
815   
R-Squared 0.1300 0.0292 0.0282   
Notes: Table shows the results for the OLS estimation of a model, showing the coefficients associated 
with each variable and robust standard errors in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 Table 5: Regression Analysis for Using High-End Estimates as Dependent Variable 
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(1) (2) (3) 
 
Log(Highestimate) Log(Highestimate) Log(Highestimate) 
Variables     
 
Female -.3503807*** 
(.09) 
-.2038857** 
(.08) 
-.1970595*** 
(.08) 
Age 
 
.0073793*** 
(.002 
.0087643*** 
(.003 
Deceased 
 
 .3669808*** 
(.13) 
.3246421** 
(.13) 
Size 
  
-1.59e-06 
( 2.12e-06) 
Created 
  
  .0031594  
(.003) 
Signature 
  
  -.1765126**    
( .09 
Auctiontotsale 
  
  -.1765126** 
( 3.62e-08) 
Drawdum 
  
 .1133147 
(.16) 
Paintdum 
  
.4626918*** 
( .09) 
Constant 8.776526***    
(.0424138 ) 
 8.185085*** 
( .1506771 ) 
 1.68937 
( 7.5) 
Observations 815 815  815 
R-Squared 0.0196 0.0912  0.1313 
Notes: Table shows the results for the OLS estimation of a model, showing the coefficients associated 
with each variable and robust standard errors in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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